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Romosca et al.: Domestic Law

DOMESTIC LAW
I. ACTUARIAL TESTIMONY ESSENTIAL TO DETERMINE THE PRESENT
CASH VALUE OF PENSIONS

In Smith v. Smith' the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that
testimony of an actuary is required when a court calculates the present
cash value of a pension for purposes of dividing marital property. 2 The
Smith opinion places South Carolina among relatively few jurisdictions
that require actuarial testimony in valuing pensions.'
Mildred Elizabeth Smith and Rudolph Lee Smith had been married
for approximately thirty-five years when they separated on July 18, 1988.
Mrs. Smith brought the instant divorce action against her husband, and
the family court equitably divided the Smith's marital property. The trial
judge valued the husband's civil service retirement fund at $43,991, the
amount actually contributed by the husband during his years of employment. The judge then awarded to the wife one-third of the value of the
pension, and the wife appealed. 4 The court of appeals held that the trial
judge incorrectly valued the husband's pension.'
In South Carolina a trial judge generally has broad discretion to
determine the equitable distribution of marital property in a divorce
proceeding. 6 However, in Martin v. Martin,7 the court recognized two
acceptable methods of pension valuation: (1) the "present cash value"
method, and (2) the "reserve jurisdiction" method. Under the "present
cash value" method, the court calculates the current value of retirement
payments to be received in the future and then divides that amount
between the spouses. 8 Under the "reserve jurisdiction" method, 9 the

1. 418 S.E.2d 314 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991).
2. Id. at 316.

3. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
4. Smith, 418 S.E.2d at 315-16.
5. Id. at 316.
6. E.g., Martin v. Martin, 296 S.C. 436, 440-41, 373 S.E.2d 706, 709 (Ct.
App. 1988) (citing O'Neill v. O'Neill, 293 S.C. 112, 359 S.E.2d 68 (Ct. App.

1987)).
7. 296 S.C. 436, 373 S.E.2d 706.
8. Id. at 440-41 n.2, 373 S.E.2d at 709 n.2. Once the court ascertains the
percentage of the pension's present value belonging to each spouse, the court often
awards the employee spouse the entire interest in the pension and gives the
nonemployee spouse other marital property to offset the nonemployee spouse's
interest in the plan. See In re Marriage of Hunt, 397 N.E.2d 5f1, 519 (IlI. App. Ct.

1979).
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court awards a percentage of each payment to the nonemployee spouse,
but delays actual distribution until the payments are received.'"
The Smith court held that actuarial testimony was necessary when
employing the present cash value method because "[a] valuation of the
present day value of a pension involves complicated procedures of
actualization." 11 The court reasoned that the complicated calculations
and their application to the particular facts of each case must be placed
in the record both to help the trial judge and to preserve the evidence for
appeal. 2 Because the record in Smith contained no actuarial evidence,
the court adopted the reserve jurisdiction method and modified the family
court's order by awarding the wife one-third of each payment as received
by the husband. 3
South Carolina is one of only a few jurisdictions that expressly
require actuarial or expert testimony when calculating the present value
of pensions. 4 Some states authorize other methods for calculating
present values of pensions, such as providing a formula for attorneys to
use when presenting evidence of present value,' 5 or allowing the use of

9. The Smith court describes this as the "'distribution from each payment'

method." Smith, 418 S.E.2d at 316.
10. Martin, 296 S.C. at 440-41 n.2, 373 S.E.2d at 609 n.2. Under this method,
no calculation of the present value is made because the court retains jurisdiction over
the parties and awards interests in the payments as they are received. Therefore, the

court need not calculate the risk that the plan will not vest or mature. See Hunt, 397
N.E.2d at 519.
11. Smith, 418 S.E.2d at 316.

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 683 P.2d 319, 322 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (finding

no abuse of discretion for employing the reserve jurisdiction method because both
parties failed to present expert testimony on the present cash value as required); In

re Marriage of Shattuck, 184 Cal. Rptr. 698, 700 (Ct. App. 1982) (stating that the
present cash value of a pension is ordinarily the subject of expert testimony) (citing

Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589 (Cal. 1975) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by
Brown v. Brown (In re Marriage of Brown), 544 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1976) (en banc))Robert C. S. v. Barbara J.S., 434 A.2d 383, 387 (Del. 1981) (holding that the

family court abused its discretion by valuing a pension in the absence of expert
testimony); In re Marriage of Wisniewski, 437 N.E.2d 1300, 1305 (1l. App. Ct.
1982) (stating that expert testimony is generally required to evaluate the present value
of a pension).

15. See, e.g., Perry v. Perry, 350 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)
(indicating that actuarial testimony is preferred, but allowing the application of a

formula).
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documentary evidence. 6 Other jurisdictions suggest the use of experts
or actuarial evidence to value nonvested or unmatured pensions, but
refuse to require experts for pensions that have vested and matured.' 7
Some jurisdictions believe that expert testimony from an actuary is
necessary to enable a court to determine an accurate valuation of a
pension.'" Other jurisdictions distinguish vested and matured pensions
from nonvested or unmatured plans because vested, matured pensions
involve fewer contingencies in their valuations.' 9 Finally, some jurisdictions believe that these calculations are within the abilities of both
attorneys and judges.2"
The rationale for requiring actuarial testimony in calculating the
current value of a pension is consistent with the reasoning behind the
expert testimony requirement in other areas of law. For example, in
South Carolina plaintiffs must use experts to establish both the standard
of care and a breach of this standard in malpractice cases involving
doctors, attorneys, and accountants. 2 "[T]he purpose of expert opinion
is to aid the finder of fact in matters which are outside the range of
common knowledge and experience."2 However, expert testimony is
not required when "no special learning is needed to evaluate the

16. Hortis v. Hortis, 367 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (finding no
abuse of discretion by the trial court in relying on a pay stub to adjust a six-monthold annual statement of pension value).
17. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Sawyer, 335 S.E.2d 277, 281 (Va. Ct. App. 1985)
(allowing use of other evidence to calculate the value of a vested pension, but
indicating that expert testimony may be required for nonvested pensions).
18. See Smith v. Smith, 418 S.E.2d 314, 316 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991). As noted
in Smith, the calculation of present value involves complicated actuarial procedures.
Id. at 316. The current value of a future stream of payments must be discounted to
reflect various contingencies that may affect eventual payment, including "mortality,
inflation, interest,. probability of vesting and probability of continued employment."
DuBois v. DuBois, 335 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn. 1983) (en banc); see also
Rosenburg v. Rosenburg, 497 A.2d 485, .496 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (listing
retirement age and salary increase as additional factors), cert. denied, 501 A.2d 845

(Md. 1985).
19. See, e.g., Sawyer, 335 S.E.2d at 281.
20. See, e.g., Perry v. Perry, 350 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
21. See, e.g., Kemmerlin v. Wingate, 274 S.C.'62, 65, 261 S.E.2d 50, 51
(1979) (requiring expert testimony in accountant malpractice case); Mali v. Odom,
295 S.C. 78, 80-81, 367 S.E.2d 166, 168 (Ct. App. 1988) (requiring expert
testimony in legal malpractice case); Stallings v. Ratliff, 292 S.C. 349, 353, 356
S.E.2d 414, 416 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that expert testimony is ordinarily required
in medical malpractice case).
22. Stallings, 292 S.C. at 353, 356 S.E.2d at 417.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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defendant's conduct."' Accordingly, expert testimony is probably
unnecessary for pension valuations that are not complicated. 24 In Smith
the husband's pension was vested, but the court nevertheless required
actuarial testimony.'
The Smith holding creates other uncertainties. For instance, if
actuarial testimony is required, who has the burden of presenting the
required testimony, and what are the consequences of failing to present
this evidence?' In Wood v. Wood 7 the court of appeals noted that "it is
the duty of counsel to present to the judge evidence from which he may
find with a reasonable degree of accuracy the value of the property
sought to be equitably distributed." 28 The Wood court also noted that
the trial judge has the statutory power to appoint experts as necessary and
assess the costs against any of the parties.2 9 However, the Smith court
ignored both of these options and utilized the reserve jurisdiction method
of valuation because of the absence of actuarial testimony.3"
The final issue raised by Smith involves the extent of a court's
discretion to determine a value for a pension after the actuaries have
testified. South Carolina trial courts clearly may not place a value on
marital assets that is not supported by at least some evidence.3 Furthermore, a court is not permitted simply to average two estimated values. 2

23. Botehlo v. Bycura, 282 S.C. 578, 583, 320 S.E.2d 59, 62 (Ct. App. 1984);
see also Bessinger v. De Loach, 230 S.C. 1, 94 S.E.2d 3 (1956) (holding that an
unintentional wounding during a dental procedure did not require expert testimony
to prove negligence).
24. As previously noted, at least one court has created an exception for vested
and matured pensions. See supra notes 17 & 19 and accompanying text.
25. Smith v. Smith, 418 S.E.2d 314, 316 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991).
26. See Smith v. Smith, 682 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
parties have an equal burden to present evidence on value and should not be rewarded

for presenting insufficient evidence), repudiatedon othergroundsby Gehm v. Gehm,
707 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Victor v. Victor, 453 A.2d 1115, 1117 (Vt.
1982) (holding no error in trial court's valuation of a pension based on wife's
expert's testimony because husband failed to present his own expert).

27. 292 S.C. 43, 354 S.E.2d 796 (Ct. App. 1987).
28. Id. at 48, 354 S.E.2d at 799 (citing Shaluly v. Shaluly, 284 S.C. 71, 325
S.E.2d 66 (1985)).
29. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-474 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991)).
30. Smith, 418 S.E.2d at 316-17. This option is within the trial court's discretion

in otherjurisdictions requiring expert testimony. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 683 P.2d
319, 322 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); cf. Addis v. Addis, 705 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Ark.

1986) (finding no error in valuing the pension at the amount actually contributed
because no actuarial evidence was offered).
31. Hyde v. Hyde, 302 S.C. 280, 282, 395 S.E.2d 186, 187 (Ct. App. 1990).
32. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 300 S.C. 1, 5, 386 S.E.2d 267; 269 (Ct. App. 1989).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/8
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The purpose of requiring actuarial testimony is to help trial judges with
calculations beyond their expertise and to provide a sufficient record for
review. Therefore, as long as the trial court's value is suggested by an
expert3 or falls within the range of values given by two or more
experts,34 and the record explains the calculations used, an appellate
court will not likely disturb the valuation.
The Smith holding, which requires the testimony of an actuary when
calculating the present cash value of a pension, presents some practical
difficulties for attorneys. Attorneys should note that the court did not
expressly limit its holding to domestic litigation. Additionally, the
holding specifically requires an actuary's testimony; therefore, accountants and other financial professionals may not qualify. The reserve
jurisdiction method adopted by Smith may be the most suitable alternative
for dividing a pension, especially in those cases when the cost of hiring
an actuary is prohibitive.
Rochelle L. Romosca

II. REQUIRING CHILD WITNESS TO TESTIFY OUTSIDE OF THE
DEFENDANT'S LINE OF SIGHT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
In State v. Lopez" the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right "to be confronted with the witnesses
against [her]" 3 6 was not violated when two child witnesses testified
against her at trial, although the defendant was seated outside of the
children's line of sight.37 The court also held that the defendant had no
constitutional right to attend the competency hearing of the child
witnesses. 3" However, because the court failed to develop a workable
standard for future cases, the constitutionality of the Lopez decision is
questionable.

33. See Woodward v. Woodward, 294 S.C. 210, 214, 363 S.E.2d 413, 416 (Ct.
App. 1987).
34. See Ferguson, 300 S.C. at 5, 386 S.E.2d at 269.
35. 412 S.E.2d 390 (S.C. 1991).

36. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
37. Lopez, 412 S.E.2d at 392-93.
38. Id. at 392. In addition, the Lopez court recognized and approved the use of
testimony regarding "shaken baby syndrome" when the testimony is "given by a

properly qualified expert and [the] testimony may support an inference that the child's
injuries were not ...accidental." Id. at 393. This article does not address that aspect
of the case.
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The defendant, Lopez, was convicted of murdering her three-yearold stepson. Her other two stepsons, aged seven and five, testified
against her at trial. Before trial, the judge held a competency hearing for
the two stepsons, whom the solicitor planned to call as witnesses. The
court did not allow Lopez to attend the hearing; however, her counsel
was present and actually questioned the boys.39 The trial judge ruled the
children competent to testify, but ordered that Lopez be kept out of the
children's line of sight during their testimony. After her conviction, the
defendant argued that her exclusion from the competency hearing and her
placement outside of the children's line of sight during their testimony
-violated her constitutional right to confrontation."
The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected Lopez's arguments.
The court first relied on Kentucky v. StincerAI in holding that a defendant
has no right to be present at a competency hearing.4" The court next cited
Maryland v. Craig43 in support of its holding that the method in which
the children testified did not violate the Confrontation Clause." The
court found that under Craig, when the State makes an adequate showing
of necessity, the State's interest in protecting a child from trauma
overrides the defendant's interest in a face-to-face confrontation with the
witness.4 5 Under the Lopez court's rationale, trial courts must determine

39. Id. at 392. At this hearing the children answered questions relating to the
substance of their testimony, including whether they had observed the defendant
abusing their younger brother. Id.
40. Id. at 391.
41. 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
42. Lopez, 412 S.E.2d at 392 (citing Stincer, 482 U.S. 730). However, Lopez is

distinguishable from Stincer, in which the child witness did not answer any questions
during the competency hearing concerning the substance of his trial testimony. The
Court recognized the possible due process problems of such a situation: "[A]
competency hearing in which a witness is asked to discuss upcoming substantive
testimony might bear a substantial relation to a defendant's opportunity better to
defend himself at trial." Stincer, 482 U.S. at 746; see also id. at 746 n.20 (discussing
Lopez-type situations).
The Lopez court avoided this due process issue altogether by noting that Lopez's
counsel failed to object to the competency hearing testimony and thus, did not
preserve the issue for appeal. This approach forces defense counsel to make the
strategic choice between objecting to the substantive testimony, thereby losing the
opportunity to learn what the prosecution will introduce at trial, or not objecting, and
losing a potential ground for appeal.

43. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
44. Lopez, 412 S.E.2d at 392 (citing Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157).

45. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/8
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necessity on an ad hoc basis.46 The court concluded that the trial judge
had adequate evidentiary support to find that the children would be
traumatized by a face-to-face confrontation with the defendant.47
Lopez is not as analogous to Craig as the supreme court assumed.
In Craig the United States Supreme Court held that
if the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, the state interest
in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child
abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a special
procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial
against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with
the defendant.48

The Court then articulated a three-prong test to determine when the
requisite level of necessity is present. First, the finding of necessity must
be case-specific.49 Second, the trial court must find that the presence of

the defendant, not merely the trial court atmosphere, traumatizes the

46. See State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 351, 353 S.E.2d 451 (1987) (finding in
camera testimony by child-victim and her mother relating to child's fear of defendant
adequate to justify videotaped testimony).
47. Lopez, 412 S.E.2d at 392-93. The court observed that the trial judge not only
interviewed the children, but also received evidence from a psychologist supporting
the use of procedural safeguards. Id. at 392. The trial court's actions paralleled those
approved of by the South Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Murrell, 302 S.C. 77,
393 S.E.2d 919 (1990).
48. Craig, 1'1O"S. Ct. at 3169.
49. Id. This case-specific finding of necessity distinguishes Craig from Coy v.
Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). In Coy the Courtheld that a state statute which required
a screen to be placed between a sexually abused child and the alleged abuser during
the child's testimony violated the defendant's right to confrontation. Id. at 1014,
1020. The Court's objection in Coy, however, was to the "legislatively imposed
presumption of trauma." Id. at 1021. In contrast, the Craig Court noted that the trial
judge had to determine that the videotaping procedure was necessary for that
particular child's welfare before the trial court could employ the protective
procedure. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3171.
Notably, South Carolina required a case-specific finding of necessity even
before the United States Supreme Court decided Coy. See State v. Rogers, 293 S.C.
505, 508, 362 S.E.2d 7, 9 (1987) (holding that "[p]rior to allowing the victim's
testimony to be presented by videotape, specific factual findings should have been
made as to the necessity of using the procedure for this particular witness").
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 8
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

child witness." Finally, the trial court must find that the emotional
51
trauma that the child will suffer is more than de minimis.
The Craig Court, however, did not determine the degree of
emotional trauma required before a special procedure can be implemented. 2 Following the Craig Court's lead, the Lopez court also failed to
specify the required degree of emotional trauma for child witnesses.
Instead, the court merely found that the evidence offered in support of
the trial judge's finding of "necessity" was adequate. 3 Additionally,
none of the South Carolina cases cited in Lopez specifies the degree of
trauma that justifies the use of protective measures for child witnesses. 4
Furthermore, the South Carolina statute that authorizes special protection
for child witnesses does not specify any requisite degree of trauma.55
Because of the vagueness of the statute, the trial court's findings, and the
Craig Court's opinion, it is unclear whether the South Carolina Supreme
Court should have found the protective procedure in Lopez constitution56
al.

50. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169. This prong is particularly important in cases like
Lopez, in which the witnesses testify in the courtroom, but outside the visual presence
of the defendant.
51. Id.
52. The Court found that the showing of "necessity" required by the Maryland
statute at issue was more than sufficient to satisfy its test. Id. The Maryland statute
requires the trial judge to find that "testimony by the child victim in the courtroom

will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot
reasonably communicate." MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii)
(1989) (emphasis added).
53. Lopez, 412 S.E.2d at 392-93. The court listed as adequate evidentiary support

for the trial judge's conclusions, a letter from a psychologist, the solicitor's testimony
that another expert had concluded that the children would be "traumatized" by
testifying in front of Lopez, and the trial judge's observation of the children's

demeanor. Id.
54. See State v. Murrell, 302 S.C. 77, 393 S.E.2d 919 (1990); State v. Rogers,
293 S.C. 505, 362 S.E.2d 7 (1987); State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 351, 353 S.E.2d 451

(1987).
55. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). Section 163-1530(G), not mentioned in Lopez, states that "[tihe court shall treat 'special'
witnesses sensitively, using closed or taped sessions when appropriate" and that

"[t]he.solicitor or defense shall notify the court when a victim or witness deserves
special consideration." Id.
56. Even if the supreme court or the General Assembly specifies a level of
trauma from which the child must suffer, the constitutionality of that level will

remain questionable until the United States Supreme Court answers the question it
side-stepped in Craig, unless the level is the same as that of the Maryland statute. See

supra note 52.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/8
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The South Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Lopez found that the
trial court did not violate the defendant's right to confrontation by
placing the defendant out of the child witnesses' line of sight. Although
the court noted that the children would have been "traumatized" had they
been able to see the defendant while they testified, the court did not
specify the degree of trauma the children would have suffered. Because
of South Carolina's nonspecific statute, the Lopez court's failure to
establish a standard, and the Craig Court's avoidance of the issue, the
constitutionality of the Lopez decision is questionable.
Pamela A. Wilkins

m.

AGENCY MUST PROVE THREAT TO CHILD BY A PREPONDERANCE
OF THE EVIDENCE TO REMOVE CHILD FROM FOSTER CARE

In Aiken County Department of Social Services v. Wilcox57 the

South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the Department of Social
Services (DSS) must justify, by a preponderance of the evidence, a
decision to remove a child from foster care and place the child in

Although states' child witness statutes vary, many are not as stringent as
Maryland's statute. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (Harrison Supp. 1991)
(requiring finding that child will suffer "at least moderate emotional or mental harm"
by testifying in open court) with N.Y. CalM. PROC. LAW § 65.20 (McKinney 1992)
(requiring showing of severe mental or emotional harm to child witness resulting
from testifying in court). Several courts that have addressed their child witness statute
since Craig have either ignored the Craig Court's statement about emotional trauma
or have equated their state's standard with Maryland's. See, e.g., State v. Crandall,
577 A.2d 483, 486 (N.J. 1990) (noting that "[tihe trial court's findings were made
in the context of the New Jersey statute, which requires a showing of 'severe
emotional or mental distress'

. . .

is consistent with the Maryland statute upheld in

Craig") (citations omitted).
For a more extensive discussion of the relationship between various state
standards and the Craigdecision, see generally Mark A. Small & Ira M. Schwartz,
Policy Implications for Children's Law in the Aftermath of Maryland v. Craig, 1
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 109 (1990) (focusing on the difference between statutes
designed to increase convictions and those designed to protect children); Susan H.
Evans, Note, Criminal Procedure- Closed CircuitTelevision in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases:Keeping the Balance Between Realism andIdealism - Maryland v. Craig, 26
WAKE FOREST L. Rv. 471 (1991) (discussing th& problems that Craig will create
with respect to state statutes).
57. 304 S.C. 90, 403 S.E.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1991).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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emergency protective custody. 58 The Wilcox court refused to equate
removing a child from foster care with terminating parental rights.5 9
The appellants, David and Renee Wilcox, were the foster parents of
three children. DSS removed all three children from the Wilcoxes' home
after discovering that one of the children, Kasha, had been injured. The
Wilcoxes claimed that Kasha's injuries were caused by a fall down their
attic steps and by an accident of unknown cause. However, a worker at
a home for abused and neglected children examined Kasha and noted that
she had severe bruises and extensive injuries. In addition, two doctors
who examined Kasha concluded that her injuries were not caused entirely
by a fall.' The family court found, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the Wilcoxes had abused and neglected Kasha; accordingly, the court
ordered that all three children remain in the custody of DSS. 6
On appeal the Wilcoxes argued that DSS should have been required
to prove its case by clear and convincing evidence because this action
was, in effect, an action for termination of parental rights. 62 The
Wilcoxes argued that under the United States Supreme Court's holding
in Santosky v. Kramer,63 due process requires courts to use a standard of
clear and convincing evidence. 64 The Santosky Court held that a state
must present at least clear and convincing evidence before the state can
terminate the parental rights of natural parents.' However, Santosky is
easily distinguishable from the instant case because Santosky concerns the
rights of natural parents, not foster parents.' 4
In affirming the family court, the court of appeals held that DSS's
action was not a proceeding to terminate parental rights, but rather a

58. Id. at 93, 403 S.E.2d at 143-44. Section 20-7-610 of the South Carolina
Children's Code authorizes emergency protective custody for children when there is

.probable cause to believe that by reason of abuse or neglect there exists an imminent
danger to the child's life or physical safety." S.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 20-7-610(A)(1)

(Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1991).
59. Wilcox, 304 S.C. at 92-93, 403 S.E.2d at 143.

60. Id. at 91-92, 403 S.E.2d at 143.
61. Id. at 91, 403 S.E.2d at 143. The trial judge found that Mrs. Wilcox
physically abused Kasha and that Mr. Wilcox neglected Kasha by not protecting
Kasha from Mrs. Wilcox's abuse. Id.
62. Id. at 92, 403 S.E.2d at 143. Sections 20-7-1560 to -1582 of the Children's
Code govern the procedures for terminating parental rights. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 207-1560 to -1582 (Law. Co-op. 1976).

63. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
64. Brief of Appellant at 10-13.

65. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769-70.
66. See Wilcox, 304 S.C. at 93, 403 S.E.2d at 143.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/8
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protective custody proceeding authorized by statute.67 The court noted
that under section 20-7-650(H) of the South Carolina Code, the
applicable standard in this situation is proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.68 The court concluded that DSS had successfully proved its
case under this standard.69
By refusing to classify this case as a termination of parental rights,
the Wilcox court avoided the question of whether foster parents have a
liberty interest in maintaining the foster family unit. The United States
Supreme Court addressed, but declined to answer this question in Smith
v. Organizationof FosterFamiliesfor Equality & Reform.7" In Smith the
foster parents claimed that a psychological attachment develops between
a child and the foster parents and that these ties make the child a part of
the foster family.7 The Court had previously stated in Moore v. City of
East Cleveland 72 that matters relating to family life are protected liberty
interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 However, the Smith Court
distinguished Moore because the state in Smith did not interfere with a
natural family, but with a foster family.74 The Court emphasized that the
"natural family" has its origins entirely apart from the power of the state;

67. Id. at 93, 403 S.E.2d at 143-44. Section 20-7-610 of the Children's Code
provides for intervention by a local child protective service agency. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-7-610 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1991), cited in Wilcox, 304 S.C. at 93, 403
S.E.2d at 144.
68. Wilcox, 304 S.C. at 93, 403 S.E.2d at 144 (applying S.C. CODE ANN. § 207-650()(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991)).

69. Id. The court also rejected the Wilcoxes' contention that DSS violated their
due process rights by failing to conduct a fair, thorough, and impartial investigation
of the allegations of physical abuse and neglect. The court found the Wilcoxes' claim

to be without merit. because the record did not indicate anything other than a
thorough, fair, and impartial investigation. Id. at 93-94, 403 S.E.2d at 144.
70. 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (holding that New York's procedure for removing
children from foster homes did not violate foster parents' procedural due process
rights). Numerous jurisdictions have held that foster parents have no constitutionally

protected liberty interest in maintaining the foster family unit. See, e.g., Kyees v.
County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 600 F.2d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam);
Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200,

1206 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); Sherrard v. Owens, 484 F.
Supp. 728, 741-42 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 644 F.2d 542 (6th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828 (1981).
71. Smith, 431 U.S. at 839.
72. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).

73. Id. at 498-99.
74. Smith, 431 U.S. at 845.
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whereas, the "foster family" is created by state law through contractual
agreements. 7 5
Policy considerations also support the conclusion that foster parents
have no protected liberty interest in preserving the foster family
relationship. The goal of foster care is to prepare a child for return to the
natural parents or to permanent adoptive parents.76 Because foster care
is a temporary and transitional period for the child, the state disfavors
vesting foster parents with a liberty interest.'
The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the family court's use
of the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof standard. The court
stated that the removal of children from foster care is not equivalent to
a termination of parental rights, but merely a protective intervention
pursuant to South Carolina law. By applying this standard to foster
families, the court recognized the fundamental difference between foster
and natural parent-child relationships and refused to treat the former as
constitutionally protected.
Steven M. Pruitt
IV. CHILD CUSTODY AWARD CANNOT REQUIRE CUSTODIAL PARENT

TO LIVE WITHIN SPECIFIC DISTANCE OF OTHER PARENT UNLESS IN
THE BEST INTEREST OF CHILD
In Eckstein v. Eckstein78 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
invalid a child custody order that required the custodial parent to live
within a 250-mile radius of the noncustodial parent. 79 The court of
appeals noted that the trial judge made no finding of fact that the
geographical limitation was in the best interest of the children. 0 Some
three months later in VanName v. VanName, ' the court of appeals
refused to require the custodial parent to remain within close proximity
of the noncustodial parent. ' The VanName court based its decision on

75. Id.
76. Id. at 823.
77. Id. at 833.
78. 410 S.E.2d 578 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991).
79. Id. at 580.
80. Id. The trial judge ordered the limitation because he felt that the children
might suffer adverse effects if they were not allowed to see their father on a regular
basis. Id.
81. 419 S.E.2d 373 (S.C. Ct. App.), aff'd on reh'g, 419 S.E.2d 373 (S.C. Ct.

App. 1992).
82. Id. at 374.
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the liberty interests of the custodial parent. 3 These two cases illustrate
an apparent shift by South Carolina courts away from certain presumptions that have dominated child custody disputes in the past.
The Ecksteins were married in 1980 and had two children during the
marriage. On November 21, 1988, Mrs. Eckstein filed an action for
divorce, which the family court granted to her in August 1989. At a later
hearing, the family court awarded custody of the two children to Mrs.
Eckstein, but required her to live within 250 miles of her former
husband. Mrs. Eckstein challenged this limitation on her right to move
with her children."4
On appeal the court of appeals recognized South Carolina's
presumption against removing a child from the state in which custody is
granted. 5 However, the Eckstein court held that the 250-mile limitation
would not, in this case, be "in the best interests of the children. "I The
court observed that Mrs. Eckstein might find it necessary to move out of
state "in order to maximize her employment potential as an engineer."87
The court also found that neither the husband nor the wife had any other
relatives living in South Carolina." Accordingly, the court vacated the
geographical limitation on Mrs. Eckstein's custody. 9

83. Id. The court also determined that the best interests of the children demanded
that they remain in their mother's custody. Id.
84. Eckstein, 410 S.E.2d at 579. Mrs. Eckstein also appealed the family court's
awards of child support, equitable division, and attorney's fees.
85. Id. at 580 (citing McAlister v. Patterson, 278 S.C. 481, 299 S.E.2d 322
(1982)). In McAlister the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
ruling that the custodial mother could not remove her son from Laurens County. The
trial court noted that South Carolina and other jurisdictions recognize a presumption
against removal, although removal would be appropriate if necessary to benefit the
child. McAlister, 278 S.C. at 483, 299 S.E.2d at 323. The McAlister court found that
remaining in Laurens County would be in the child's best interest because of the
child's close relationship with his father, and because the child's grandparents and a
great-grandparent lived within thirty miles of Laurens County. Id.
86. Eckstein, 410.S.E.2d at 580.
87. Id. Mrs. Eckstein has a degree in engineering and worked as an engineer

until she went to work for her husband's business in February 1987. After her former
employer was unable to offer her a position, Mrs. Eckstein found an engineering job
with Boeing Aerospace Company in Huntsville, Alabama. Id. at 579.
88. Id. at 580. Distance from family relatives was an important factor in the
McAlister court's decision to affirm the limitation on the custodial parent's place of
residence. See McAlister, 278 S.C. at 483, 299 S.E.2d at 323.
89. Eckstein, 410 S.E.2d at 580. The court limited its holding by stating that the
father would be allowed to petition the court for a change in the custody order if
circumstances were to develop that reflected a need for the children to live closer to
their father. Id. In addition, the court of appeals affirmed the family judge's
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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In VanName v. VanName ° the father sought an order requiring the
mother, who was awarded custody of the children, to live where
visitation by the father would be convenient.9 After the trial court
refused to impose a distance restriction, the father appealed. The court
of appeals affirmed,
but approached the issue in a different manner than
9
2
Eckstein.
in
In VanName the court stated that requiring a person to reside in a
certain place "encroaches upon the liberty of an individual to live in the
place of his or her choice. " 91 The court found that, although judges
have the discretion to impose residency restrictions, such restraints
"should be exercised sparingly. "9' The VanName court reconciled
McAlister by stating that the trial judges in both cases "properly
considered the best interests of the children. "'
Judicial granting of custody has been wrought with numerous
presumptions that have gradually lost importance over time. Historically,
the common-law presumption was that the father should be awarded
custody because he was the head of the household.96 This notion later
gave way to a presumption in favor of the mother. 97 Most states now
have begun to move away from presumptions when granting custody,

determination of child support, equitable division, and attorney's fees. Id.
90. 419 S.E.2d 373 (S.C. Ct. App.), aff'd on reh'g, 419 S.E.2d 373 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1992).
91. Id. The father sought a change of custody in the alternative. Id.
92. Id. at 374-75.
93. Id. at 374.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 375. The VanName court considered the best interests of the children
in determining whether to change the custody of the children, but the court looked
to the liberty interests of the mother in evaluating the request for restricting the

location of the mother's residence. Id. at 374-75.
96. See, e.g., Latham v. Ellis, 20 S.E. 1012, 1012 (N.C. 1895) ("Under the

common law, the father's claim to the custody of his minor children, under all
circumstances was paramount."). See generally MAXWELL H. BLOOMFIELD,
AMERICAN LAWYERs IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876, at 117-20 (1976).
97. See, e.g., Hild v. Hild, 157 A.2d 442, 448 (Md. 1960) ("As a general rule,
• .. the custody of a child, especially one of tender years, is awarded to the
mother.").
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/8
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focusing instead solely on the best interests of the child. 9 The presumption against removal has been abolished in many jurisdictions.'
The Eckstein and VanName decisions seem to suggest a movement
by South Carolina courts in that same direction. Although the court in
Eckstein acknowledged the presumption against removal, its final
decision rested upon the best interests of the children."° In VanName the
court did not acknowledge the presumption at all. Such presumptions are
no longer viable, and courts should no longer recognize them when
granting custody. Even if a court considers the best interests of the child,
as in Eckstein, the presumption tends to weigh heavily on the court's
decision. Ultimately, the child's best interests should be the determinative
factor in custody decisions. The "best interests of the child" test weighs
all of the important factors and yields a meaningful decision.
Although neither Eckstein nor VanName expressly rejects the
presumption against removal, both cases reflect a movement away from
presumptions. This movement is in line with a majority of jurisdictions
that have rejected presumptions and have started to base custody
decisions on the best interest of the child.
C. Leigh Boyd

V. MARITAL ESTATE INCLUDES SETTLEMENT SUCCESSFULLY
PURSUED BETWEEN DIVORCE AND PROPERTY DIVISION

In Mears v. Mears'0 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that
a settlement of a spouse's wrongful termination claim is marital property
98. See, e.g., Wetzler v. Wetzler, 570 P.2d 741,743 (Alaska 1977) (per curiam)
("Determination of the child's best interests must turn on a balancing of the unique
facts of each case rather than on outmoded presumptions."); see also McAndrew v.
McAndrew, 382 A.2d 1081 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) (construing state statute as
abolishing maternal preference for young children in custody proceedings).
99. See, e.g., Scinaldi v. Scinaldi, 347 S.E.2d 149 (Va. Ct. App. 1986); cf. In
re Jessica M., 527 A.2d 766 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (allowing foster parents to
move to England with foster children even though the move would temporarily curtail
natural mother's visitation rights), aff'd, 538 A.2d 305 (Md. 1988).
100. Eckstein, 410 S.E.2d at 580. The court implied that the presumption is
meaningless in the absence of specific findings in the record that a geographic
restriction on the custodial parent is necessary to protect the best interests of the
children. See id. ("While, as a rule, the presumption is against removal of a child
from the state ... [t]here are no findings of fact showing such a limitation is in the
best interest of the children.").
101. 305 S.C. 150, 406 S.E.2d 376 (Ct. App. 1991), aft'd, 417 S.E.2d 574 (S.C.
1992).
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when the cause of action accrued during the marriage, but neither spouse
knew of the potential claim until after their divorce.'" The court
concluded that, because the spouse successfully resolved the claim prior
to the division of the marital property, the settlement is subject to
equitable distribution under the Equitable Apportionment of Marital
Property Act.1 3 While Mears presented an issue of first impression in
South Carolina, the court of appeals purportedly adopted the reasoning
of the majority of the jurisdictions that have faced similar situations in
dividing marital property."1 4
Thp Mearses had been married since June 25, 1965. On December
20, 1988, Mr. Mears commenced an action for divorce, which the family
court granted to him on February 10, 1989. However, the divorce decree
reserved the distribution of the marital property for a later hearing.10 5
Mr. Mears had worked for the "Company"" for nearly five years
when he was terminated on August 26, 1985. Before the divorce, neither
he nor his wife was aware that the circumstances surrounding his
termination created a cause of action for wrongful discharge. On March
10, 1989, Mr. Mears hired an attorney to pursue the possibility of a
wrongful discharge action against the "Company." Mr. Mears and his
former employer settled the claim on April 13, 1989, for $82,900.107
At the property division hearing in June 1989, Ms. Mears claimed
an interest in the wrongful termination settlement as marital property.
The trial court held that the settlement was not marital property because
neither party was aware of the potential claim before the commencement
of the divorce proceedings and because Mr. Mears did not pursue the
action until after the divorce. 0 8 Ms. Mears appealed, and the court of
appeals reversed. 109

102. Id. at 156, 406 S.E.2d at 380.
103. Id. The Equitable Apportionment of Marital Property Act is codified at S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-471 to -479 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). Importantly, the Mears
court also held that, in the absence of bad faith or an attempt by one spouse to

conceal an unliquidated claim, the other spouse cannot share in the claim if it is first
asserted after a judicial division of the marital property. Mears, 305 S.C. at 157, 406
S.E.2d at 380; see infra note 133 and accompanying text.

104. Mears, 305 S.C. at 154, 406 S.E,2d at 378.
105. Id. at 152, 406 S.E.2d at 377.
106. The parties agreed to keep the name of the employer confidential. Record

at 2.
107. Mears, 305 S.C. at 152, 406 S.E.2d at 377.

108. Id. at 152, 406 S.E.2d at 378. The trial court also noted that there was no
evidence of bad faith or an attempt by Mr. Mears to conceal the claim from his wife
during the marriage. Id.

109. Id. at 152, 406 S.E.2d at 377.
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The court of appeals began its analysis with the Equitable Apportionment of Marital Property Act,"' which defines marital property as "'all
real and personal property which has been acquired by the parties during
the marriage and which is owned as of the date of filing or commencement of marital litigation.'"1' The court noted that the word "property" has an "unusually broad meaning" and "includes choses in action. "112
Because this case raised an issue of first impression in South
Carolina, the court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance.' The
court found that, although "the cases dealing with this issue from other
jurisdictions show disparate treatment in the handling of unliquidated
claims in property divisions,"15 a majority of those cases have focused
only on certain factors in determining the classification of such a claim.
First, the date that the settlement award is actually received is
irrelevant. 6 In Goode v. Goode"7 an Arkansas court held that, if a
claim accrues during a marriage, any settlement from that claim is
marital property regardless of when the settlement is actually received. 8

110. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-471 to -479 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
111. Mears, 305 S.C. at 153,406 S.E.2d at 378 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 207-473). None of the five exceptions listed in section 20-7-473 apply to the present
case. Id.
112. Id. (citing Lott v. Claussens, Inc., 251 S.C. 478, 163 S.E.2d 615 (1968)).
113. Id. at 152, 406 S.E.2d at 378.
114. The court noted that the trial court had factually distinguished two South
Carolina cases that concerned post-divorce property actions. Id. at 153, 406 S.E.2d
at 378. In Orszula v. Orszula, 292 S.C. 264, 356 S.E.2d 114 (1987), the supreme
court held that a settlement from the husband's workers' compensation claim was
marital property. The trial court distinguished Orszula from the present case because
the claim in Orszula was settled before the divorce and because both parties were
aware of the claim. Mears, 305 S.C. at 154, 406 S.E.2d at 378. The trial court also
distinguished the earlier case of Phillips v. Phillips, 290 S.C. 455, 351 S.E.2d 178
(Ct. App. 1986) (involving a personal injury settlement), because the settlement was
received during the marriage and because the case was decided before the effective
date of the new Equitable Apportionment of Marital Property Act. Mears, 305 S.C.
at 154, 406 S.E.2d at 378-79.
115. Mears, 305 S.C, at 154, 406 S.E.2d at 379.
116. See id. at 154-55, 406 S.E.2d at 379 (citing Goode v. Goode, 692 S.W.2d
757 (Ark. 1985); Dillard v. Dillard, 772 S.W.2d 355 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989)).
117. 692 S.W.2d 757 (Ark. 1985).
118. Id. at 759 (citing In re Marriage of Dettore, 408 N.E.2d 429 (111. App. Ct.
1980)).
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Secondly, the purpose or nature of the settlement is of primary
importance." 9 The Mears court cited Lynch v. Lynch, 2 ° a New York
property division case that concerned a potential recovery for breach of
a long-term employment contract.'' The Lynch court held that any
potential recovery would not be marital property because such an award
would compensate the husband for damages relating only to employment
after the divorce. "
Finally, another important factor is whether the loss that gave rise
to the claim falls on the marriage partners together, or the injured spouse
alone.'" In re Marriage of Kuzmiak concerned the distribution of
separation pay received by the husband after an involuntary discharge
from the military." The California court noted that this kind of pay is
"intended to ease the transition into civilian life, not as compensation for
past services."'' Thus, the Kuzmiak court reasoned that the time of the
discharge was the crucial factor in determining who bore the burden of
the loss of employment. If the husband were discharged before the
commencement of the divorce, the court would have classified the
separation pay as marital property because
both parties would have borne
26
the burden of the loss of employment.
The Mears court applied these factors and held that the settlement
in the instant case was marital property.' 27 Although Mr. Mears did not
receive the settlement until after the divorce, the cause of action accrued
during the marriage. Furthermore, the settlement was intended primarily
to compensate the husband for wages he would have received while he
was married. Finally, because the parties were married at the time of the
28
discharge, they both bore the burden of the loss of employment.

119. See Mears, 305 S.C. at 154-56, 406 S.E.2d at 379-80.
120. 505 N.Y.S.2d 741 (App. Div. 1986).
121. Mears, 305 S.C. at 154, 406 S.E.2d at 379 (citing Lynch, 505 N.Y.S.2d
741).
122. Lynch, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
123. See Mears, 305 S.C. at 155-56, 406 S.E.2d at 379-80 (citing In re Marriage

of Kuzmiak, 222 Cal. Rptr. 644 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885 (1986)).
124. Kuzmiak, 222 Cal. Rptr. 644.
125. Mears, 305 S.C. at 156, 406 S.E.2d at 379 (citing Kuzmiak, 222 Cal. Rptr.
644)).
126. Kuzmiak, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 646-47.
127. Mears, 305 S.C. at 157, 406 S.E.2d at 380.
128. See id. at 156, 406 S.E.2d at 380. The court of appeals noted that when the
"Company" terminated Mr. Mears, the couple was within five years of paying off
the mortgage on their home. The loss of employment made it necessary for the
Mearses to refinance their mortgage. This eventually caused the couple to lose their
home in foreclosure. Id. at 156 n.1, 406 S.E.2d at 380 n.1.
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The purpose of equitable distribution statutes is to divide marital
property fairly, regardless of which spouse holds title to such property. 29 Legislatures enacted these statutes inresponse to the emerging idea
that "marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking, and in many
ways is akin to a partnership. "130 The Mears holding is consistent with
this purpose. The parties were married for more than three years after
Mr. Mears's discharge, so both parties bore the burden of this loss.
Moreover, had the "Company" not wrongfully discharged Mr. Mears,
the marriage partnership would have shared in his future wages.
Accordingly, Ms. Mears should receive a portion of the settlement that
represents compensation for wages her husband would have received
during their marriage.
The court's analysis is analogous to the "analytical" approach used
by other jurisdictions in deciding whether workers' compensation or
personal injury claims are marital property. 3 ' South Carolina courts
previously have used the "mechanistic" approach when determining the
division of such awards. 132 The Mears decision, however, could change
South Carolina's approach to domestic property divisions of workers'
compensation and personal injury claims from "mechanistic" to "analytical."
Mears extends the definition of marital property to include certain
choses in action that accrue during a marriage, even though the
settlement is not received until after the divorce. Both the purpose of a
settlement and who must bear the burden of the loss following the injury
should determine whether the settlement is marital property. However,
because of the special need to bring marital litigation to an end, the court
limited a spouse's right to claim a settlement as marital property only to

129. See generally 24 AM. JuR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 870 (1983).
130. Id.
131. See Weisfeld v. Weisfeld, 545 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 1989). The "analytical"
approach "looks to the nature of a . . . damage award to determine whether the
property is separate .... or marital property subject to distribution." Id. at 1345.
132. See, e.g., Orszula v. Orszula, 292 S.C. 264, 356 S.E.2d 114 (1987); see
also James F. Thompson, Comment, Workers' Compensation and PersonalInjury
Awards Constitute MaritalProperty, 40 S.C. L. REV. 105, 106 (1988) (stating that
the Orszula court found that workers' compensation awards are marital property

because such awards are not specifically excluded from the statute). Under the
"mechanistic" approach, "if afn] ...award was acquired during the marriage, then
it must be considered marital ... property and divided as such unless it falls within
specific but limited statutory exceptions." Weisfeld, 545 So. 2d at 1344.
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those actions
that are commenced before the court-ordered division of
33
property. 1
C. Leigh Boyd

133. Mears v. Mears, 305 S.C. 150, 157,406 S.E.2d 376, 380 (Ct. App. 1991),
af4'd, 417 S.E.2d 574 (S.C. 1992).
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